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NOTE
The Legality of Deliberate Miranda Violations:
How Two-Step National Security Interrogations
Undermine Miranda and Destabilize
Fifth Amendment Protections
Lee Ross Crain*
As part of the global “War on Terror,” federal agents intentionally delay issu-
ing Miranda warnings to terrorism suspects during custodial interrogations.
They delay the warnings presuming that unwarned suspects will more freely
offer vital national security intelligence. After a suspect offers the information
he has, agents administer Miranda warnings and attempt to elicit confessions
that prosecutors can use at the suspect’s trial. No court has ruled on the con-
stitutionality of this two-step national security interrogation process to deter-
mine whether admitting the second, warned confession is allowed under
Miranda v. Arizona and its progeny. A fragmented Supreme Court examined
two-step interrogations generally in Missouri v. Seibert but offered no clear
holding. This Note argues that while confessions derived from two-step na-
tional security interrogations are admissible under Justice Kennedy’s Seibert
test, courts should instead apply Justice Souter’s Seibert test to limit the use of
such interrogations. This Note further contends that permitting two-step na-
tional security interrogations contravenes the spirit, if not the letter, of the
Fifth Amendment as well as decades of Miranda jurisprudence.
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Introduction
Before he pled guilty to conspiring to support the al-Shabaab terror or-
ganization in June 2012,1 Mohamed Ibrahim Ahmed moved to suppress in-
criminating statements he had made to federal agents.2 Ahmed made these
statements during an interrogation that proceeded in two steps. First, during
the interrogation’s “dirty” stage, American agents interrogated Ahmed with-
out issuing the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona.3 Second, during
the interrogation’s “clean” stage, American agents again interrogated Ahmed
but this time issued the Miranda warnings.4 According to the government,
agents hoped that their failure to warn during the interrogation’s first stage
would lead Ahmed to speak more freely about information germane to na-
tional security.5 According to Ahmed, agents also hoped that issuing warn-
ings before the second stage would allow prosecutors to use Ahmed’s
1. Benjamin Weiser, Man Offers Guilty Plea, Upending Terror Case, N.Y. Times, June 14,
2012, at A28, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/14/nyregion/man-who-trained-
with-somalis-offers-guilty-plea-ending-pivotal-case.html.
2. Defendant Mohamed Ibrahim Ahmed’s Pretrial Motion to Dismiss the Indictment,
Suppress Statements & Strike Surplusage in the Indictment at 25, United States v. Ahmed, No.
10 Cr. 131 (PKC), 2011 WL 7782579 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2011) [hereinafter Motion to
Suppress].
3. Defendant Mohamed Ibrahim Ahmed’s Post-Hearing Memorandum in Support of
His Motion to Suppress Post-Arrest Statements at 2–3, Ahmed, 2012 WL 1805050 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 28, 2012) [hereinafter Defense Brief]. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).
4. Defense Brief, supra note 3, at 52.
5. Government’s Post-Hearing Reply Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Mo-
tion to Suppress at 29–30, Ahmed, 2012 WL 6061229 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2012) [hereinafter
Government Brief].
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second-stage incriminating statements at trial.6 In both phases of the inter-
rogation, Ahmed’s statements confirmed that he was involved with the al-
Shabaab terror organization.7
After his indictment, Ahmed moved to suppress these incriminating
statements8 and challenged the agents’ two-step process as a “clever strata-
gem” and a mere “ruse” to violate his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.9 The government opposed the motion, asserting that the
post-warning, second-step confessions were admissible under Missouri v.
Seibert.10
In Seibert, a deeply divided Supreme Court considered the admissibility
of confessions elicited during two-step interrogation processes.11 Specifically,
an officer in that case testified that he had intentionally undertaken a two-
step process for the explicit purpose of vitiating the effectiveness of the de-
fendant’s Miranda warnings.12 Although five justices held that Seibert’s in-
criminating statements were inadmissible, they disagreed in three separate
opinions as to why.13 Consequently, Seibert did not issue a clear holding.14
Seibert’s two most influential opinions—Justice Kennedy’s solo concur-
rence and Justice Souter’s four-vote plurality15—analyzed the interrogation
procedure in different ways.16 Justice Kennedy’s opinion concluded that a
defendant’s confession is presumptively inadmissible when elicited through
6. Defense Brief, supra note 3, at 2.
7. See Government Brief, supra note 5, at 2, 31, 36, 60.
8. Motion to Suppress, supra note 2, at 5.
9. Defense Brief, supra note 3, at 2–3.
10. See Government Brief, supra note 5, at 2 (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600
(2004) (plurality opinion)).
11. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 604 (2004) (plurality opinion). Justice Kennedy
provided the fifth vote to a splintered Court. Id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
12. See id. at 604–06 (plurality opinion).
13. See id. at 604, 617 (finding statements inadmissible because the midstream Miranda
warnings were not objectively effective); id. at 617 (Breyer, J., concurring) (supporting an
exclusionary rule for Miranda violations where courts would exclude the “fruits” of the initial
unwarned questioning unless the failure to warn was in good faith); id. at 622 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (concluding that statements should be excluded if law enforce-
ment officials deliberately deployed the two-step strategy to undermine the effectiveness of the
Miranda warnings and failed to take curative measures).
14. See State v. O’Neill, 936 A.2d 438, 453 (N.J. 2007) (“The Seibert opinions have sown
confusion in federal and state courts . . . .”); Elwood Earl Sanders, Jr., Breaching the Citadel:
Willful Violations of Miranda After Missouri v. Seibert, 10 Appalachian J.L. 91, 103 (2011)
(noting that lower courts have “struggled” to determine Seibert’s rule).
15. Although Justice Breyer drafted his own opinion, he adopted the “plurality’s opin-
ion in full” under the assumption that the holding was essentially the same as that offered in
his own opinion. He also adopted Justice Kennedy’s opinion “insofar as it [wa]s consistent
with [Justice Breyer’s own] approach.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 618 (Breyer, J., concurring).
16. Compare id. at 617 (plurality opinion), with id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment).
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a two-step interrogation process that police deliberately undertake “in a cal-
culated way to undermine the Miranda warning.”17 This test focused on the
purposefulness of the law enforcement agent’s actions as well as the motives
underlying this conduct. By contrast, Justice Souter’s test focused on the
defendant’s experience during the interrogation.18 Justice Souter directed
courts to admit second, warned confessions only if the Miranda warnings
functioned “ ‘effectively’ as Miranda requires.”19 While a majority of the fed-
eral circuits have adopted Justice Kennedy’s opinion as Seibert’s rule,20 sub-
stantial grounds remain to encourage the application of Justice Souter’s
approach.21
The prosecution and defense in Ahmed both sparred within the confines
of Justice Kennedy’s Seibert concurrence in motions before the Southern
District of New York because the Second Circuit had previously found Jus-
tice Kennedy’s test binding.22 Accordingly, the Ahmed parties largely ignored
Justice Souter’s plurality opinion, and Ahmed’s battle for suppression and
the government’s Seibert defense largely focused on the federal agents’ sub-
jective motive for pursuing the two-step interrogation.23 The government
17. Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
18. Id. at 611–12 (plurality opinion).
19. Id.
20. See United States v. Green, 388 Fed. App’x 375, 380 (5th Cir. 2010) (unpublished
opinion) (“Seibert requires the suppression of a post-warning statement only where a deliber-
ate two-step strategy is used and no curative measures are taken . . . .” (quoting United States
v. Nunez-Sanchez, 478 F.3d 663, 668 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)));
United States v. Carter, 489 F.3d 528, 536 (2d Cir. 2007) (“We now join our sister circuits in
holding that Seibert lays out an exception to Elstad for cases in which a deliberate, two-step
strategy was used by law enforcement to obtain the postwarning confession.”); United States v.
Narvaez-Gomez, 489 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[I]f the two-step method is not deliber-
ate, the post–warning statements are admissible if voluntarily made . . . .”); United States v.
Ollie, 442 F.3d 1135, 1142 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting that Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion is
of “special significance” (quoting United States v. Briones, 390 F.3d 610, 613 (8th Cir. 2004)));
United States v. Kiam, 432 F.3d 524, 532 (3d Cir. 2006) (“This Court applies the Seibert plural-
ity opinion as narrowed by Justice Kennedy.” (citing United States v. Naranjo, 426 F.3d 221,
231–32 (3d Cir. 2005))); United States v. Mashburn, 406 F.3d 303, 309 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Jus-
tice Kennedy’s opinion . . . represents the holding of the Seibert Court.”). But see United States
v. Johnson, 680 F.3d 966, 978–79 (7th Cir. 2012) (declining to decide which test to apply since
both tests led to the same result in the case at hand), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 672 (2012); United
States v. Jackson, 608 F.3d 100, 103–04 (1st Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. Carrizales-
Toledo, 454 F.3d 1142, 1150–51 (10th Cir. 2006) (same).
21. When no Supreme Court opinion garners a majority, Marks v. United States directs
lower courts to adopt the “narrowest” opinion as the divided Court’s holding. 430 U.S. 188,
193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion))
(internal quotation marks omitted). It is unclear, however, what makes an opinion “narrow-
est.” See infra Section III.C for an in-depth review of how to apply Justice Souter’s test while
remaining consistent with Marks.
22. See Carter, 489 F.3d at 535–36 (noting that all the circuits that had decided the issue
had adopted Justice Kennedy’s approach).
23. The government did not deny that the agents intentionally (rather than acciden-
tally) failed to give Ahmed his Miranda warnings. See Government Brief, supra note 5, at
28–29.
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argued “that the agents’ [sole] intent was to obtain information relevant to
the national security of the United States and thus to protect the public.”24
The defense countered that the interrogation served impermissible, “dual”
purposes: to gather evidence for national security and to undercut the effec-
tiveness of Ahmed’s Miranda warnings.25
It remains unclear whether post-warning confessions are admissible af-
ter law enforcement intentionally conducts an unwarned “dirty” interroga-
tion purportedly to elicit vital information for national security. In Ahmed,
Judge Castel in the Southern District of New York never had a chance to rule
on the admissibility of Ahmed’s post-warning statements because Ahmed
preemptively pled guilty.26 The guilty plea eliminated an important opportu-
nity to clarify the law in a case presenting a new permutation of two-step
interrogations. In these novel circumstances, the government’s proffered
motive for undertaking a two-step interrogation was arguably credible
enough to pass Justice Kennedy’s intent- and motive-based test.27
While many lower courts have grappled with Seibert in the domestic
criminal justice context, it appears that no court has actually determined
what impact first-step national security interrogations have on the admissi-
bility of second-step post-warning confessions. This is not a mere technical
curiosity. The two-step national security interrogation strategy at issue in
Ahmed is an important tool in the federal government’s “War on Terror.”28
24. Id. at 27.
25. Defense Brief, supra note 3, at 56–57.
26. Weiser, supra note 1 (discussing the fact that Judge Castel had prepared a sixty-page
ruling on the motion for suppression, which, due to the guilty plea, would have to be sup-
pressed). Compare this result with United States v. Abdulmutallab, where the court admitted
incriminating statements that the defendants made in circumstances distinct from those dis-
cussed in this Note. No. 10-20005, 2011 WL 4345243, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 16, 2011). Specif-
ically, the court noted that agents had credible fears of imminent threats to the public safety,
which thus justified, under the “public safety” exception established in New York v. Quarles,
467 U.S. 649 (1984), withholding Miranda warnings. Id.
27. Contra United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 481 (2d Cir. 2010) (indicating that the
government offered a noncredible motive to argue that it did not intend to circumvent Mi-
randa through a two-step interrogation process).
28. See Charlie Savage, Holder Backing Law to Restrict Miranda Rules, N.Y. Times, May
10, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/10/us/politics/10holder.html?
pagewanted=all (noting that the Obama Administration “had been stretching the traditional
limits of how long suspects may be questioned without being warned of their rights” since at
least December 2009); Weiser, supra note 1 (referring to “the Obama administration’s strategy
of interrogating terrorism suspects for both intelligence and law enforcement purposes”);
Memorandum, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Custodial Interrogation for Public Safety and
Intelligence-Gathering Purposes of Operational Terrorists Inside the United States (Oct. 21,
2010) [hereinafter FBI Memorandum], available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/us/25
miranda-text.html (“After all applicable public safety questions have been exhausted, agents
should advise the arrestee of his Miranda rights and seek a waiver of those rights before any
further interrogation occurs, absent exceptional circumstances described below.”); see also
Norman Abrams, Responses to the Five Questions, 38 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1597, 1601–02
(2012) (describing the two-step interrogation process used in the case of Ahmed Warsame).
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Similar interrogation processes have been used in many high-profile antiter-
rorism cases, including during the questioning of the Detroit “Undergar-
ment Bomber,”29 the “Times Square Bomber,”30 and, it appears, the
surviving Boston Marathon bomber.31 The admissibility of confessions de-
rived from two-step national security interrogations directly affects what
prosecutorial and investigatory tools are available to government officials
both at home and abroad. The legality of such interrogation strategies also
speaks broadly about longstanding tensions between the competing desires
for individual freedom and collective security.
This Note argues that while confessions derived from two-step national
security interrogations are admissible under Justice Kennedy’s Seibert test,
courts should instead apply Justice Souter’s Seibert test to limit the use of
such interrogations. This Note further contends that permitting two-step
national security interrogations contravenes the spirit, if not the letter, of the
Fifth Amendment as well as decades of Miranda jurisprudence.32 Part I de-
scribes Miranda’s evolution and explains how to properly apply Justice Ken-
nedy’s Seibert test to two-step interrogations. Part II demonstrates that
Justice Kennedy’s test would render Ahmed’s particular second-stage confes-
sions admissible, contrary to the spirit and letter of prior Miranda jurispru-
dence. Part III argues that courts should adopt Justice Souter’s plurality test,
which would likely disallow the Ahmed two-step national security interroga-
tion, as a better means of analyzing the admissibility of confessions elicited
during any two-step interrogation. Finally, given that Justice Kennedy’s test
currently reigns in most federal circuits, Part IV suggests that courts can
apply various evidentiary rules to repair the damage that Justice Kennedy’s
test wreaks on Miranda and contends that law enforcement officials need
not fear giving Miranda warnings in the national security context.
I. Proper Application of Justice Kennedy’s Seibert Test
To understand how these two-step interrogations affect Miranda and the
Self-Incrimination Clause, it is necessary to situate Justice Kennedy’s test in
29. Savage, supra note 28.
30. Id.
31. See Luke Johnson, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Receives Miranda Rights After Delay for Public
Safety Exception, Huffington Post (Apr. 22, 2013, 7:05 PM) (updated Apr. 23, 2013, 7:43
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/22/dzhokhar-tsarnaev-miranda_n_3134745
.html. Note that at the time of this Note’s writing, not all facts regarding the surviving Boston
Marathon bomber’s interrogation had been made public. Given what is publicly known, how-
ever, it appears that agents purposefully withheld Miranda warnings during interrogations of
the suspect Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. See Cheryl K. Chumley, Boston Bombing Suspect Dzhokhar
Tsarnaev Suffered ‘High-Powered Injury’ at Arrest: Court Documents, Washington Times (Aug.
20, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/20/dzhokhar-tsarnaev-suffered-
high-powered-injury-arr/ (noting that recently unsealed court documents revealed that agents
questioned Tsarnaev for two days without Miranda warnings, relying on the public safety
exception).
32. See generally Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 621, 668–74 (1996), for a discussion of some of Miranda’s virtues.
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the context of history and current doctrine. Accordingly, Section I.A briefly
addresses Miranda’s evolution. Section I.B then articulates the proper appli-
cation of Justice Kennedy’s test.
A. Situating Seibert in the Broader Context of Miranda Jurisprudence
Miranda established a clear and absolute rule to protect defendants’
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.33 Before Miranda, the
Court’s self-incrimination jurisprudence focused on a case-by-case, subjec-
tive “voluntariness” test, which rendered confessions admissible unless “ ‘a
defendant’s will was overborne’ by the circumstances surrounding the giving
of a confession.”34 Miranda, by contrast, announced an objective, bright-line
rule. Instead of the unclear, ad hoc, and retroactive voluntariness inquiry,
Miranda requires that officers apprise defendants of their rights before any
custodial interrogation.35 Because the environment surrounding a custodial
interrogation is “inherently” coercive and “impair[s]” a defendant’s “capac-
ity for rational judgment,”36 only when a defendant receives warnings that
advise him of his rights can his statements “truly be the product of his free
choice.”37
The Court’s clear mandate nevertheless left open the question of what
consequences should follow Miranda violations. Although a defendant’s un-
Mirandized confession was deemed inadmissible, the status of other evi-
dence or confessions garnered as a result of Miranda violations was less
33. Cf. Johnathan L. Rogers, Note, A Jurisprudence of Doubt: Missouri v. Seibert, United
States v. Patane, and the Supreme Court’s Continued Confusion About the Constitutional Status
of Miranda, 58 Okla. L. Rev. 295, 296–97 (2005) (noting that the pre-Miranda test “failed
both to provide a clear standard by which to judge the admissibility of confessions and to
prevent coercive interrogation practices”). The Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda is based,
ensures that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442–43
(1966) (noting that after the 1688 revolution, the English gradually erected “additional barri-
ers for the protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary power” (quoting Brown v.
Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596 (1896)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974) (“The privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was developed
by painful opposition to a course of ecclesiastical inquisitions and Star Chamber proceedings
occurring several centuries ago.”); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 427 (1956) (ex-
plaining that the Constitution evidences and crystallizes the Founders’ “judgment . . . that it
[would be] better for an occasional crime to go unpunished than that the prosecution should
be free to build upon a criminal case, in whole or in part, with the assistance of enforced
disclosures by the accused” (quoting Maffie v. United States, 209 F.2d 225, 227 (1st Cir. 1954))
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 91 (1908) (indicating
that by the time of the American Revolution, the protection against self-incrimination “had
become embodied in the common law” and was enshrined within five state constitutions or
bills of rights), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
34. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bus-
tamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)).
35. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
36. Id. at 465, 467.
37. Id. at 458.
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clear.38 The Court faced this question in Oregon v. Elstad.39 In Elstad, the
defendant confessed both before and after officers administered the Miranda
warnings.40 The defendant challenged the admissibility of his second,
warned confession.41 There was no evidence that the officers intended to
withhold Miranda warnings or to trick the defendant into confessing: the
failure to warn seemed to be a good-faith mistake.42 Ultimately, the Supreme
Court concluded that the defendant’s second, warned confession was admis-
sible because it was voluntarily made.43
In Elstad, the Supreme Court declined to establish a rule excluding all
evidence police discover as a result of failing to give a defendant Miranda
warnings as required.44 Simply put, the Court found that the failure to give
Miranda warnings does not “taint” a later, post-warning confession and
render it inadmissible.45 Instead of excluding a post-warning confession au-
tomatically, Elstad held that courts should admit the second, warned confes-
sion if it was voluntarily made.46 Elstad instructed that courts should look to
“the surrounding circumstances [of the interrogation] and the entire course
of police conduct with respect to the suspect . . . [to] evaluat[e] the volunta-
riness of [the suspect’s] statements.”47 Ironically, the effective consequence
of a Miranda violation under Elstad is that courts apply to the second con-
fession the same ad hoc, subjective voluntariness inquiry that Miranda origi-
nally rejected.
In Seibert, the Court faced a different, although related, issue: the effect
of an officer’s intentional failure to issue Miranda warnings on subsequent,
warned confessions.48 Specifically, officers interrogated Patrice Seibert
38. See, e.g., Tucker, 417 U.S. at 445–46 (discussing whether an exclusionary rule should
be applied to the “fruits” of Miranda violations). See Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944),
for an example of how earlier courts dealt with two-step interrogations.
39. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
40. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 300–02.
41. Id. at 303.
42. Id. at 300–02, 308–09.
43. Id. at 318.
44. Id. at 307 (“[T]he Miranda presumption, though irrebuttable for purposes of the
prosecution’s case in chief, does not require that the statements and their fruits be discarded as
inherently tainted.”). Despite the ruling in Elstad, justices on the Supreme Court still disagree
about what the appropriate consequences of a Miranda violation should be. Compare United
States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 639 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he Miranda rule creates a
presumption of coercion, in the absence of specific warnings, that is generally irrebuttable for
purposes of the prosecutor’s case in chief.”), with Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 617 (2004)
(Breyer, J., concurring) (“Courts should exclude the ‘fruits’ of the initial unwarned question-
ing unless the failure to warn was in good faith.”). See generally Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 485 (1963), for a description of exclusionary rules in the Fourth Amendment
context.
45. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307, 318.
46. Id. at 318.
47. Id.
48. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 604 (plurality opinion).
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through a two-step process.49 First, unlike in Elstad, officers intentionally
withheld Miranda warnings so that Seibert would be more likely to con-
fess.50 Only after Seibert admitted that she was guilty of murder did the
police issue the Miranda warnings.51 They subsequently re-elicited the mur-
der confession by reminding Seibert that she had already admitted her
guilt.52 Police testified that they purposefully delayed the Miranda warnings
to more easily elicit the confession.53 The Supreme Court again rejected an
automatic exclusionary rule, even when the police intentionally failed to is-
sue Miranda warnings. Consequently, Seibert’s confession—the “fruits” of
the police officers’ deliberate Miranda violation—was not suppressible per
se.54 Unlike in Elstad, however, a splintered majority of the Court found
Seibert’s second, warned confessions inadmissible based on the facts of the
case.55
B. Seibert and Justice Kennedy’s Opinion
Justice Kennedy focused his analysis on the subjective intent and moti-
vation of law enforcement officers.56 His solo opinion concluded that Sei-
bert’s confession was presumptively inadmissible because the officers had
acted deliberately “in a calculated way to undermine the Miranda warn-
ing.”57 He did not merely ask whether Seibert’s second confession was vol-
untary; evidently he thought that the circumstances of her interrogation
were so different from those in Elstad that a different rule was required.
Under Justice Kennedy’s test, if law enforcement officers engaged in a delib-
erate, two-step interrogation for the impermissible purpose of undermining
the effectiveness of the midstream Miranda warnings, courts can render a
subsequent, warned confession admissible only if law enforcement officers
took “curative measures” to ensure that midstream warnings were effective.58
49. Id. at 604–05.
50. Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
51. Id. at 605 (plurality opinion).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 605–06.
54. Id. at 615–17. Contra id. at 617 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Courts should exclude the
‘fruits’ of the initial unwarned questioning unless the failure to warn was in good faith.”).
55. Id. at 617 (plurality opinion); id. at 618 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 622 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
56. Id. at 620–22 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Both Justice O’Connor’s
dissenting opinion and Justice Souter’s plurality opinion rejected Justice Kennedy’s focus on
subjective intent. See id. at 623–26 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he plurality correctly de-
clines to focus its analysis on the subjective intent of the interrogating officer. . . . [T]he
approach espoused by Justice Kennedy is ill advised.”).
57. Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
58. While Justice Kennedy did not illuminate what exactly constituted a sufficient “cur-
ative measure[ ],” he did state that “a substantial break in time and circumstances” between
the two steps or “an additional warning that explains the likely inadmissibility of the prewarn-
ing custodial statement” may be sufficiently curative. Id.
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If law enforcement officers did not engage in such a deliberate process, how-
ever, courts have to analyze the defendant’s subsequent confessions under
Elstad’s voluntariness inquiry.59 Ultimately, Justice Kennedy found that the
law enforcement officers involved in Seibert conducted the two-step interro-
gation deliberately for the purpose of vitiating the Miranda warnings’ effec-
tiveness.60 Because law enforcement officers did not use significant curative
measures to ensure that the Miranda warnings were effective, Justice Ken-
nedy voted to suppress the confession.61
Justice Kennedy’s test presents two subjective inquiries that inform
courts whether they should apply the curative measures analysis or the El-
stad voluntariness inquiry.62 First, did the officers actually intend to engage
in a two-step process?63 Second, was the goal of the interrogation to under-
mine the effectiveness of the Miranda warnings?64 These are two different
questions, although at times courts conflate them.65
59. Id. The curative measures analysis is more demanding than Elstad’s mere voluntari-
ness inquiry, which allows a second, warned confession to be admitted if it is prefaced by a
voluntary waiver of rights. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1984). Instead, the curative
measures requirement forces affirmative action to ensure that “a reasonable person in the
suspect’s situation would understand the import and effect of the Miranda warning and of the
Miranda waiver.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
60. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. (asking first whether the two-step interrogation is “deliberate”).
64. Id. at 621; see also Daniel S. Nooter, Note, Is Missouri v. Seibert Practicable?: Su-
preme Court Dances the “Two-Step” Around Miranda, 42 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1093, 1094 (2005)
(“Justice Kennedy . . . focus[es] not on the state of mind of the suspect, but on the motives of
the interrogating officer.”).
65. For example, United States v. Naranjo, 426 F.3d 221, 232 (3d Cir. 2005), glosses over
Justice Kennedy’s focus on the officers’ motive. A deeper analysis of lower court Seibert rulings
reveals that many courts seem to jettison the motive-based inquiry as moot. See, e.g., United
States v. Courtney, 463 F.3d 333, 338–39 (5th Cir. 2006) (implying that Justice Kennedy’s
subjective test may only have an intent-based prong but ultimately resting its holding on the
fact that the curative measures were sufficient regardless). Some courts that treat the inquiry as
moot do so because they determine that officers did not intend to delay or omit Miranda
warnings. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 388 F. App’x 375, 380–81 (5th Cir. 2010) (unpub-
lished opinion); United States v. Mashburn, 406 F.3d 303, 309 (4th Cir. 2005). When courts
determine that the failure to warn was unintentional (i.e., accidental), they tend to conflate
Justice Kennedy’s intent- and motive-based tests, perhaps because precision is simply not nec-
essary under such circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Carrizales-Toledo, 454 F.3d 1142,
1152–53 (10th Cir. 2006) (purportedly applying Kennedy’s test but focusing on whether the
agent “intentionally withheld the Miranda warnings during the initial interrogation”);
Naranjo, 426 F.3d at 232 (purportedly applying Kennedy’s test but stating the relevant inquiry
as whether “the initial failure to warn . . . was inadvertent”). That a court describes Justice
Kennedy’s test imprecisely in certain circumstances does not indicate that the test should be
applied that way universally.
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While Justice Kennedy did not explicitly divide his inquiry in this way,
his opinion suggests a two-part intent- and motive-based test.66 Justice Ken-
nedy’s greatest concern with the technique at issue in Seibert was that the
omission was not only intentional but also “designed to circumvent” the Mi-
randa warnings’ effectiveness.67 The officers’ motive in undertaking this two-
step interrogation technique particularly concerned Justice Kennedy:
The Miranda warning was withheld to obscure both the practical and legal
significance of the admonition when finally given. . . . The strategy is based
on the assumption that Miranda warnings will tend to mean less when
recited midinterrogation, after inculpatory statements have already been
obtained. This tactic relies on an intentional misrepresentation of the pro-
tection that Miranda offers. . . .68
Justice Kennedy’s opinion thus imposed a bifurcated test examining both an
interrogator’s subjective intent and motive. Whether a court should ulti-
mately analyze a confession under the affirmative demands of the curative
measures inquiry or the more lax Elstad voluntariness test depended on
whether the court found that officers intentionally engaged in a two-step
interrogation for the purpose of vitiating the Miranda warnings’
effectiveness.69
II. Justice Kennedy’s Test Weakens Miranda
This Part examines Seibert in the context of national security interroga-
tions. Section II.A applies Justice Kennedy’s test to Ahmed and concludes
that under this test, Ahmed’s second-stage self-incriminating statements
would not be suppressed by a trial court. Section II.B finds that permitting
these two-step national security interrogations is normatively undesirable
and demonstrates how the test weakens self-incrimination protections. Fi-
nally, Section II.C contends that the general threat of terrorism is an insuffi-
cient excuse to limit a defendant’s Miranda or Fifth Amendment rights.
66. For the purposes of this Note, “intent” is defined as the deliberateness of an actor’s
conduct. “Intentional” conduct is conduct that an actor consciously and deliberately under-
takes; “unintentional” conduct is that which may be accidental. “Motive” is defined as an
actor’s goal. “Motive” asks for what purpose an actor undertakes his conduct.
67. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis
added).
68. Id. at 620–21.
69. Id. at 621–22; see also, e.g., United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 477 (2d Cir. 2010)
(“[W]e must address whether the officers employed a ‘deliberate, two-step strategy, predicated
upon violating Miranda during an extended interview . . . .’ ” (quoting Seibert, 542 U.S. at 621
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment))); United States v. Crisp, 371 F. App’x 925, 932
(10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished opinion) (“Justice Kennedy proposed an intent-based test that
would apply only when ‘the two-step interrogation technique was used in a calculated way to
undermine the Miranda warning.’ ” (quoting Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in the judgment))); United States v. Briones, 390 F.3d 610, 614 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Nothing in
the record suggests that these law enforcement officers from different agencies used a deliber-
ate strategy of staged interrogations to circumvent Briones’ Fifth Amendment rights.”).
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A. Application of Justice Kennedy’s Test to Ahmed Demonstrates
a Defendant’s Disadvantages
The admissibility of post-warning confessions elicited during two-step
national security interrogations will often turn on Justice Kennedy’s subjec-
tive-intent test. To defend against a suppression motion, the government has
to demonstrate one of three things. First, it can attempt to show that agents’
initial failure to warn was not intentional and that suppression should be
denied under Elstad.70 Proof that the omission was unintentional renders
moot the question of motive. Second, the government can attempt to
demonstrate that, although the two-step process was intentional, the motive
driving the interrogation was permissible and suppression should be denied
under Elstad.71 Namely, the federal agents can suggest that in failing to warn,
they were not seeking to more easily elicit admissible confessions, as officers
did in Seibert, but rather they were seeking vital national security informa-
tion. Third, the government can attempt to prove that, although the two-
step process was intentional and had an impermissible motive, agents took
sufficient curative steps.72 As the government conceded in Ahmed, the failure
to issue Miranda warnings for the purposes of collecting national security
information is intentional.73 Therefore, under a proper application of Justice
Kennedy’s test, the question of the agents’ motive and the sufficiency of any
curative steps becomes the crux of whether courts should suppress confes-
sions derived from two-step national security interrogations.
Although Ahmed’s guilty plea prevented Judge Castel from ruling on
Ahmed’s suppression motion, the objective evidence presented in that case
likely supported the agents’ contention that their motive for pursuing a two-
step interrogation was permissible. To bolster the agents’ claim, the govern-
ment contended that the questions in each step of the interrogation were
fundamentally different. In the “dirty” interrogation, the agents focused on
Ahmed’s terrorist associates and other information about al-Shabaab gener-
ally.74 In the “clean” interrogation, the questions focused more on what Ah-
med actually did with al-Shabaab, especially the financial contributions that
he made to the organization.75 Those financial contributions, which were
“not even discussed” in the first interrogation, were a “key aspect” of Ah-
med’s charges.76
70. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
71. See id. at 621–22 (noting that the subjective-intent test would not apply unless “the
two-step interrogation technique was used in a calculated way to undermine the Miranda
warning”).
72. Id.
73. Government Brief, supra note 5, at 38 (“[A]gents have candidly admitted that they
intended to use a two-step strategy, and explained the reasons . . . .”).
74. Id. at 31–32.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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The agents also took “significant efforts” to distinguish the two phases
of the interrogations.77 Namely, they separated the interrogations by several
days, used different interrogators, and attempted to find distinct rooms for
the interrogations.78 These efforts suggest that agents actually sought to bol-
ster the effectiveness of the Miranda warnings so that Ahmed could ration-
ally choose whether he wanted to speak during the interrogation’s second
phase.
Broader contextual evidence also supported the government’s claims
that its motives were permissible. For instance, the very nature of the War on
Terror corroborated the agents’ claims that the two-step interrogation’s pur-
pose was to gather national security information and not to weaken the ef-
fectiveness of the midstream Miranda warnings.79 Proof that federal agents
believed that their suspect had credible national security information bol-
stered the agents’ claims that they merely sought to elicit key national secur-
ity intelligence.80 The prosecution and the defense in Ahmed also debated
about what conclusions the trial court should have drawn from the agents’
testimony. The defense highlighted testimony indicating that the agents
sought to “ ‘gain [the defendant’s] trust’ and ‘create a comfortable environ-
ment where [Ahmed] didn’t feel that [they] were there targeting him, seek-
ing charges against him.’ ”81 That testimony, said the defense, supported the
“more reasonable inference . . . that the planned . . . dirty interrogation of
Mr. Ahmed served a dual purpose—to gather intelligence and to prosecute
Mr. Ahmed.”82 The government noted, again trying to justify its agents’ mo-
tives under Justice Kennedy’s test, that the goal of encouraging Ahmed to
speak is not “inconsistent” with the purpose of eliciting information for na-
tional security.83
Under Justice Kennedy’s subjective-motive inquiry, evidence like that
seen in Ahmed easily allows the government to evade the Miranda warnings
requirement. Agents can essentially interrogate at will and still use a defen-
dant’s second, warned confession so long as they intentionally fail to issue
Miranda warnings solely because they want to more easily elicit information
needed for national security purposes. Much of the subjective analysis turns
on an agent’s credibility: Can a court believe the agent when he argues that
his motives in conducting a two-step interrogation were permissible?84
77. Id. at 34.
78. Id. at 40, 43.
79. The Department of Justice permits two-step interrogation procedures when FBI
agents conclude that such interrogations are needed to garner “valuable and timely intelli-
gence.” FBI Memorandum, supra note 28. See generally John T. Parry, Terrorism and the New
Criminal Process, 15 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 765 (2007) (describing how the War on Terror
has changed criminal processes).
80. See Government Brief, supra note 5, at 28.
81. Defense Brief, supra note 3, at 56 (first and second alterations in original) (quoting
the transcript of Agent Dent’s testimony).
82. Id. at 56–57.
83. Government Brief, supra note 5, at 28–29.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 670 F.3d 222, 229 (2d Cir. 2012).
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Judges are likely to find agents to be more credible than terrorism suspects.85
That credibility, coupled with objective corroborative evidence, demon-
strates the government’s inherent advantages under Justice Kennedy’s test. It
is easier for the government to argue about, and thus prove the permissibil-
ity of, its agents’ subjective motives than it would be for the suspect to do so.
The outcome of the intent-and-motive battle matters because the appli-
cable analyses—the curative measures test and the Elstad voluntariness in-
quiry—differ in the level of protection that each affords to a defendant.
Moreover, because the government holds a clear advantage in the subjective-
motive battle, courts will frequently find that the Elstad inquiry applies, so
the government will not often need to demonstrate effective curative mea-
sures.86 Under Justice Kennedy’s formulations, curative measures must be
“designed to ensure that a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would
understand the import and effect of the Miranda . . . waiver.”87 This is no
easy burden to bear.88
Notably, the curative measures test does not simply analyze the effec-
tiveness of Miranda warnings from a reasonable person’s perspective but
incorporates the “suspect’s situation” as well.89 For example, Ahmed argued
that the break before his warned interrogations was insufficient compared to
the overall length of his captivity: he alleged that he had been interrogated
by Nigerian authorities at least eight times over a forty-one-day period
before the unwarned interrogation by U.S. agents, that there was less than a
five-day break between the unwarned interrogation and the initial warned
interrogation, and that he was not conscious of time because he lacked a
watch or a calendar.90 Likewise, the government did not offer any addendum
warning to explain that the first confession was inadmissible at trial.91 Al-
though agents explained to Ahmed that he “did not need to speak simply
because he had spoken to others previously,”92 no agent explained the differ-
ences between the two interrogations.93
Because the government holds significant advantages in the subjective-
inquiry phase, confessions such as Ahmed’s will often be admissible because
after a defendant receives warnings and gives a waiver, Elstad provides him
little protection.94 Importantly, the fact that a defendant decides to speak
85. Cf. Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 Emory L.J. 1311, 1323 (1994).
86. See Sandra Guerra Thompson, Evading Miranda: How Seibert and Patane Failed to
“Save” Miranda, 40 Val. U. L. Rev. 645, 681 (2006).
87. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 622 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
88. But see Thompson, supra note 86, at 681 (arguing that “[i]t will be a simple matter
to teach officers” to implement curative measures sufficient to meet Justice Kennedy’s test).
89. Id.
90. See Defense Brief, supra note 3, at 5–6, 62–63.
91. Id. at 63; Government Brief, supra note 5, at 43.
92. Government Brief, supra note 5, at 43.
93. See Defense Brief, supra note 3, at 63; Government Brief, supra note 5, at 43.
94. See Thompson, supra note 86, at 676 (“Elstad . . . requires the defendant to bear the
burden of proving that the second confession was involuntarily given.”).
December 2013] The Legality of Deliberate Miranda Violations 467
(and thus waive his rights) despite receiving his warnings is “highly proba-
tive.”95 The inquiry in Ahmed would have been essentially complete once the
government showed that agents read Ahmed his rights and that Ahmed
waived those rights and professed to understand them.96
B. The Subjective-Motive Inquiry Allows Agents to More Easily
Delay Miranda Warnings
As a result of advantages that Justice Kennedy’s test vests in the govern-
ment, officials can more easily elicit damning statements from defendants
before those defendants effectively understand their rights. This result con-
travenes the Founders’ judgment “that it [would be] better for an occasional
crime to go unpunished than that the prosecution should be free to build up
a criminal case, in whole or in part, with the assistance of enforced disclo-
sures by the accused.”97 The Self-Incrimination Clause is a fundamental part
of the relationship between the government and its citizens, yet Justice Ken-
nedy’s test undermines its protections.
The advantages Justice Kennedy’s test bestows upon the government, as
demonstrated in applying the test to Ahmed’s factual circumstances, illus-
trate the dangers inherent in Justice Kennedy’s focus on the subjective mo-
tives of law enforcement in a Fifth Amendment context. As one
commentator notes, “Proving an officer’s subjective intent can be nearly im-
possible if the officer professes not to have acted deliberately in violating
Miranda.”98 The agents in Ahmed fiercely contended that their motive was
not to vitiate the effectiveness of Ahmed’s Miranda warnings during their
two-step interrogation.99 The circumstances surrounding the War on Terror
and the objective facts of the interrogation itself bolstered the agents’ credi-
bility.100 While there were facts to dispute the agents’ claimed motive, their
credibility and the objective evidence would have been difficult to overcome.
Subjective credibility battles are also problematic because they incentivize
95. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985).
96. See id. (“We hold today that a suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet
uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he
has been given the requisite Miranda warnings.”); see also Defense Brief, supra note 3, at
22–23; Government Brief, supra note 5, at 58.
97. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 427 (1956) (quoting Maffie v. United
States, 209 F.2d 225, 227 (1954)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Thompson, supra note 86, at 681.
99. See Government Brief, supra note 5, at 34–35.
100. See supra Section II.A.
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law enforcement to be dishonest,101 are influenced by court bias in favor of
law enforcement,102 and lead to inconsistent opinions.103
In addition to showing us the dangers of applying a subjective, motive-
based test, the Ahmed interrogation shows how easily law enforcement can
ignore Miranda’s hard rule and still capture admissible confessions. Before
Seibert, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence admitted post–Miranda viola-
tion confessions in two basic contexts: (1) where the public or a police of-
ficer faced an imminent threat;104 or (2) where the failure to warn was
unintentional.105 Justice Kennedy’s test instead admits (voluntary) confes-
sions after Miranda violations in any circumstance where the officer’s mo-
tive was not to undermine the effectiveness of the Miranda warnings.106 This
test thus denotes a shift in Miranda jurisprudence. Formerly, only a small
subset of circumstances allowed officers to withhold Miranda warnings and
still introduce confessions at trial. Now, a much larger set of circumstances
permit prosecutors to admit confessions elicited after officers failed to issue
Miranda warnings. This state of affairs allows law enforcement to ignore too
easily Miranda’s requirements and admit confessions: Justice Kennedy’s test
seems to permit an infinite number of reasons to withhold Miranda
warnings.
Justice Kennedy’s shift from pre-Seibert jurisprudence might not have
been so dire if Elstad’s voluntariness analysis could successfully protect de-
fendants from “the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings.”107 If
courts aggressively scrutinized post-midstream warning confessions under
Elstad, then perhaps the ultimate post-Seibert analysis would not leave a de-
fendant significantly less protected than he was before Seibert. Still, given the
heavy burden on defendants to disprove voluntariness after they receive Mi-
randa warnings and waive their rights, Justice Kennedy’s opinion leaves de-
fendants more vulnerable to custodial coercion.108 For law enforcement,
101. See generally Morgan Cloud, Judges, “Testilying,” and the Constitution, 69 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1341, 1346 (1996) (recounting several instances of police dishonesty).
102. See id. at 1355 n.70 (noting that 86 percent of police officers surveyed said that it
was “unusual but not rare for judges to disbelieve police testimony”); Cloud, supra note 85, at
1323 (“When judges must decide whom to believe, it is not surprising that they usually opt to
believe law enforcers rather than lawbreakers.”).
103. See Joe¨lle Anne Moreno, Faith-Based Miranda?: Why the New Missouri v. Seibert
Police “Bad Faith” Test Is a Terrible Idea, 47 Ariz. L. Rev. 395, 397–98 (2005).
104. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657–59 (1984); see also infra Section II.C.
105. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 615 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“[I]t is fair to
read Elstad as [based on] . . . a good-faith Miranda mistake . . . .”). But see Moreno, supra note
103, at 411 (“Elstad . . . did not turn on a distinction between good and bad faith Miranda
violations.”).
106. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 621–22 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
107. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966).
108. See Thompson, supra note 86, at 646 (“The Court essentially teaches the police
how to violate Miranda intentionally and then ‘cure’ the violation so as to render the incrimi-
nating statements admissible.”).
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issuing Miranda warnings—the mechanism Miranda established to counter-
act governmental coercion109—has become less necessary, and thus defend-
ants are faced with a greater threat of compulsion.
From a doctrinal perspective, Justice Kennedy’s test is based on a novel
and “incoherent” reliance on the subjective motives of law enforcement.110
The Supreme Court has historically eschewed reliance on law enforcement’s
subjective motives in the Fifth Amendment context. When the Court ana-
lyzed a defendant’s waiver of rights, for example, it noted pointedly that “the
state of mind of the police is irrelevant to the question of the intelligence and
voluntariness of respondent’s election to abandon his rights.”111 Justice Ken-
nedy’s focus on the subjective motives of government officials damages the
protections of the Self-Incrimination Clause.112 As Justice O’Connor noted
in her Seibert dissent, the “heart” of the Fifth Amendment—“[f]reedom
from compulsion”—has nothing to do with whether law enforcement in-
tended to coerce a confession.113 Instead, the “heart” of the Fifth Amend-
ment is “whether a suspect’s decision to speak truly was voluntary.”114
Justice Kennedy’s focus on the motives of law enforcement as opposed
to the experience of the defendant is particularly problematic when viewed
through the lens of two-step national security interrogations. When law en-
forcement grills a defendant about his terrorist activity for days, such a de-
fendant might reasonably consider farcical the midstream admonition that
he has the “right to remain silent.” Especially in the national security con-
text, a defendant may be unfamiliar with American criminal procedure or
the English language.115 Yet, under Justice Kennedy’s test, federal agents can
reduce the effectiveness of a defendant’s Miranda warnings as long as they
subjectively did not intend to.116 This effect seems contrary to the spirit of
the Fifth Amendment’s mandate that the government cannot coerce a defen-
dant into serving as “a witness against himself.”117
109. See generally Leo, supra note 32, at 668–72, for an explanation of why Miranda
warnings are normatively desirable.
110. The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Leading Cases, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 306, 315 (2004)
[hereinafter Leading Cases] (“As a matter of principle, however, this emphasis on an officer’s
intent is incoherent: whether a confession is coercively obtained cannot depend on what oc-
curs inside a police officer’s head.”).
111. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 423 (1986) (emphasis added); accord New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656–57 (1984) (explaining that courts should not examine the question
of imminent harm with respect to “the subjective motivation of the arresting officer” but
rather with respect to the objective circumstances surrounding the officer when he made his
decision not to warn).
112. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 624 (2004) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Defense Brief, supra note 3, at 79.
116. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
117. U.S. Const. amend. V.
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C. The General Terrorist Threat Does Not Justify Weakening
Fifth Amendment Protections
Some suggest that weakening Miranda, as Justice Kennedy’s test has, is
most appropriate in the terrorism context,118 but the Court’s treatment of
the writ of habeas corpus, which shares a number of profound structural
similarities with the right against self-incrimination, suggests that it has al-
ready rejected this very argument in a parallel field. Both the writ of habeas
corpus and the right against self-incrimination are ancient common law
protections.119 They were added to the Constitution with memories of En-
glish tyranny and oppression firmly embedded in the minds of the Foun-
ders.120 The writ of habeas corpus and the right against self-incrimination
are “vital instrument[s] for the protection of individual liberty”121 and are
“fundamental to our system of constitutional rule.”122 Certainly there are
differences between the two protections,123 but the fundamental values they
represent and their place in history are directly comparable.
In the habeas context, the Supreme Court has noted that while the exec-
utive deserves deference to “apprehend and detain those who pose a real
danger to our security,” the protections enshrined in the Constitution
should not bend to the threats presented by modern terrorism.124 As the
Court has noted, the lessons of our Founders, the choices and judgments
they instilled in our Constitution, and “[e]stablished legal doctrine . . . must
be consulted for its teaching.”125 The Self-Incrimination Clause and the con-
stitutional rules that accompany it must not be cast aside when expediency
demands. “Security subsists . . . in fidelity to freedom’s first principles,”126
118. See, e.g., Questioning of Terrorism Suspects Act of 2010, H.R. 5934, 111th Cong.
(2010), available at http://www.govtrack.us/convgress/bills/111/hr5934/text (declaring that the
public safety exception to Miranda should apply in the terrorism context).
119. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739–42 (2008) (discussing the history of
the writ of habeas corpus); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442–43 (1966) (discussing the
age-old maxim “nemo tenetur seipsum accusare [no man is bound to accuse himself]” (quoting
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596 (1896)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 91–92 (1908) (discussing the history of the right against self-incrimi-
nation), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
120. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 742 (noting that the history of the insufficiency of the
English common law writ led the Founders to constitutionalize it); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S.
591, 597 (1896) (“So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system impress themselves upon
the minds of the American colonists that the States, with one accord, made a denial of the
right to question an accused person a part of their fundamental law . . . .”).
121. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 743.
122. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468.
123. For example, the writ of habeas corpus can be suspended under certain circum-
stances but the Self-Incrimination Clause cannot. Compare U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases or Rebel-
lion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”), with U.S. Const. amend. V (providing no
exceptions to the enforcement of the right against self-incrimination).
124. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 797.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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and terrorism is not so unique a threat as to warrant the abrogation of our
constitutional rights. Our collective security is enhanced, not diminished,
when we fulfill our legal and constitutional obligations not only in the con-
text of the writ of habeas corpus but also in that of a defendant’s right
against self-incrimination.127
Both Democratic and Republican officials have suggested that the gov-
ernment’s interest in uncovering information relevant to national security
justifies limiting a defendant’s Miranda and Self-Incrimination Clause rights
in the terrorism context more than other contexts.128 Still, government offi-
cials have not focused public debate about terrorism interrogations on Sei-
bert, despite the permission Justice Kennedy’s test grants to police officers to
withhold Miranda warnings for “proper” (including, presumably, national
security) motives. Instead, the public debate has focused largely on New York
v. Quarles129 and the Supreme Court’s narrow construction of the “public
safety” exception to Miranda.130 The public safety exception that officials
often seek to broaden permits officers to question an unwarned suspect and
introduce incriminating statements he makes at trial when the public faces
an imminent threat upon which the answers to those questions depend.131
Recently, during the debate surrounding the interrogations of Boston Mara-
thon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, officials in the Obama Administration
supported extending the public safety exception generally to terrorism
cases.132
This effort to broaden the public safety exception is misplaced. The
global terrorist threat to national security does not justify weakening Mi-
randa’s protections either through Justice Kennedy’s Seibert test or through
the Quarles public safety mechanism. Arguments to the contrary misread
the Court’s Miranda jurisprudence and undervalue the Self-Incrimination
Clause.
While Justice Kennedy’s test seems to permit two-step national security
interrogations,133 the narrower public safety exception to Miranda cannot be
127. See id. (“[T]he exercise of [executive] powers is vindicated, not eroded, when con-
firmed by the Judicial Branch.”).
128. See, e.g., Savage, supra note 28; Kasie Hunt, Republicans Rip Eric Holder on Mi-
randa Rights for Underwear Bomber, Politico (Jan. 27, 2010, 11:14 AM), http://www.politico
.com/news/stories/0110/32073.html.
129. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
130. Democratic Congressman Adam Schiff of California, for example, proposed a bill
in the House of Representatives that sought to extend Miranda’s public safety exception to
terrorism cases generally and permit prosecutors to admit unwarned confessions at trial.
Questioning of Terrorism Suspects Act of 2010, H.R. 5934, 111th Cong. (2010), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr5934/text.
131. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659.
132. Charlie Savage, Debate over Delaying of Miranda Warning, N.Y. Times (Apr. 20,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/21/us/a-debate-over-delaying-suspects-miranda-
rights.html.
133. See supra Section II.A and infra Part IV for ways to limit the damage of Justice
Kennedy’s test.
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expanded under current doctrine to permit general, unwarned terrorism in-
terrogations.134 Moreover, expanding Quarles would have profound effects
on domestic criminal procedure.135 When it established the public safety ex-
ception in New York v. Quarles, the Supreme Court focused on the “kaleido-
scopic” circumstances of highly pressurized situations where public safety is
directly threatened.136 The Court acknowledged that when human lives are
immediately in danger, an officer’s duty is to protect those lives even at the
expense of a defendant’s Miranda rights.137 In Quarles, a loaded gun was
missing somewhere in a supermarket, thus presenting a concrete, immediate
threat to officers and citizens in the area.138 The potential cost of affording
Miranda warnings was clear and substantial: lives depended on the officer
locating the gun, and issuing the Miranda warnings could have prolonged
the danger. In such situations, the Court noted, we as a society cannot de-
mand that officers rise above their “instincts” to protect the public, even at
the expense of a defendant’s rights.139 In times of imminent danger where
134. One federal district court would beg to differ with my contention: the court in
United States v. Abdulmutallab concluded that Quarles permits unwarned questioning of ter-
rorism suspects without the clear justification of an imminent threat. See United States v.
Abdulmutallab, No. 10-20005, 2011 WL 4345243 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 16, 2011). The court relied
on United States v. Khalil, 214 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2000), to argue broadly that “[t]he federal
courts have extended the logic of Quarles to the questioning of terrorism suspects.”
Abdulmutallab, 2011 WL 4345243, at *5. The court in Khalil, however, did not simply expand
Quarles to cover terrorism interrogations; it instead applied the public safety exception because
officers discovered live pipe bombs and the officers’ questions related to the stability of those
bombs. Khalil, 214 F.3d at 121. The court in Khalil correctly admitted the defendant’s un-
warned, incriminating statements under the safety exception due to an imminent threat to
public safety: officers “were concerned that the bomb would explode before they could disarm
it.” Id. at 115. By contrast, the Abdulmutallab court found that the public safety exception
permitted unwarned questioning motivated by officers’ concerns of general, undefined terror-
ism threats. See Abdulmutallab, 2011 WL 4345243, at *5–6. Certainly unwarned questions are
appropriate when they reflect concerns that terrorist attacks are imminent, but courts should
not permit unwarned interrogations under the public safety exception without the justification
of credible, imminent threats to public safety. Fortunately it appears that few courts have
applied Quarles this broadly in the terrorism context. Nonetheless, the Abdulmutallab court’s
decision has been damaging. Abdulmutallab has fanned the flames of misunderstanding about
the appropriate use of Quarles’s public safety exception. See Savage, supra note 132 (“[The
Abdulmutallab] ruling was seen by the administration as confirmation that its new policy was
constitutional . . . .”).
135. If gathering information about terrorist activity justified an exception to Miranda’s
firm requirement of advising defendants of their rights, what would stop courts from applying
the public safety exception in the domestic organized crime, gang, or narcotics conspiracy
contexts? Any defendant involved in planned criminal activity can provide information that
might hypothetically save lives, yet the mere possibility of acquiring life-saving information
does not justify systematically undermining a defendant’s right against self-incrimination. The
law need not conform to officers’ natural instincts in the two-step national security interroga-
tion context because typically the circumstances presented are not so “exigen[t]” as to justify
“spontaneity rather than adherence to a police manual.” Quarles, 467 U.S. at 656, 659 n.8.
136. Id. at 655–57.
137. Id. at 657.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 659.
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“exigency require[s] immediate action by the officers,”140 the law must bend
to an officer’s unavoidable (and perhaps laudable) instincts.
Unlike Justice Kennedy’s test, the Quarles public safety exception to the
Miranda warnings requirement does not apply in many circumstances where
the government seeks national security information from a terror suspect.141
With two-step national security interrogations, neither the public nor the
interrogating officials face imminent, credible threats to safety. In the case of
the Boston Marathon bombing, for instance, once authorities determined
that any imminent threats had subsided,142 it was inappropriate to suggest
that the public safety exception applied to Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.143 Quarles
provides “a narrow exception to the Miranda rule”: it imposes a fierce immi-
nence requirement that simply cannot justify ignoring Miranda in most
two-step national security interrogation contexts.144 By contrast, under Jus-
tice Kennedy’s Seibert test, officials could have conducted a two-step na-
tional security interrogation after the Boston Marathon bombing as long as
they were not motivated to vitiate Tsarnaev’s Miranda rights.145
III. Justice Souter’s Seibert Test Is Superior to Justice Kennedy’s
While Justice Kennedy’s Seibert test unnecessarily restricts a defendant’s
right against self-incrimination, Justice Souter’s test would revive the self-
incrimination protections of the Miranda warnings and limit the use of two-
step national security interrogations. Section III.A articulates why Justice
Souter’s test is more consistent with previous Fifth Amendment jurispru-
dence and appropriately ignores Justice Kennedy’s focus on the subjective
intent of law enforcement. Section III.B argues that, under Justice Souter’s
test, the warned confession derived from Ahmed’s two-step national security
interrogation would be inadmissible. Finally, Section III.C explains how
courts may eschew Justice Kennedy’s test and instead apply that of Justice
Souter.
140. Id. at 659 n.8.
141. See, e.g., Government Brief, supra note 5, at 27. Note that my argument here does
not encompass the rare “ticking time bomb” scenario. If officers or agents know that a terror-
ism suspect has information about a credible, imminent threat to public safety, Quarles would
clearly allow the admissibility of incriminating statements made during unwarned questioning
about that specific threat.
142. See Donovan Slack, Boston Police: Tsarnaev ‘in No Condition to Be Interrogated’,
Politico (Apr. 21, 2013, 9:18 AM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/politico-live/2013/04/bos
ton-police-tsarnaev-in-no-condition-to-be-interrogated-162205.html?hp=l3.
143. My contention here assumes that no other bombs or accomplices remained at
large; if other bombs remained undiscovered, clearly the threat to public safety would warrant
limited, unwarned questioning for the purposes of finding those bombs.
144. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657–58.
145. See supra Section II.A for further explanation as to how Justice Kennedy’s Seibert
test likely functions in the national security context.
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A. Justice Souter’s Test Is More Consistent with Miranda Jurisprudence
Justice Souter’s plurality test is a stronger means of analyzing the effect
of two-step interrogations on a defendant’s right against self-incrimination
because it is more consistent with the spirit and letter of the Miranda deci-
sion. The plurality’s opinion asked one question to determine the admissi-
bility of a post-midstream warning confession: “[W]ould [it] be reasonable
to find that in [two-step interrogations] the [Miranda] warnings could func-
tion ‘effectively’ as Miranda requires”?146 As Justice Souter noted, the point
of a two-step interrogation is “to get a confession the suspect would not
make if he understood his rights at the outset.”147 The strongest protection
against such deception is ensuring that the midstream warnings were effec-
tive as required. This test is consistent with that of Miranda on its face148 and
in its application. Miranda held that the inherently coercive atmosphere of
interrogation environments requires law enforcement to effectively apprise
defendants of their rights to render a confession uncoerced.149 The basic
thrust of Miranda thus comports with Justice Souter’s inquiry: if law en-
forcement fails to administer effective warnings, the confession is
inadmissible.150
Justice Souter’s opinion also presents a stronger doctrinal solution to
two-step interrogations by reaffirming the constitutional status of Miranda
warnings. The Court in Dickerson v. United States held that Miranda was a
“constitutional” rule by invalidating a congressional statute that attempted
to overrule Miranda.151 Although some justices continue to dispute Mi-
randa’s constitutional status,152 this holding represented the culmination of
decades of debate and clarified that the Miranda warning is a direct require-
ment of the Fifth Amendment itself rather than mere judicial prophylaxis.153
146. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 611–12 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“[Courts
should ask if] the warnings [could] effectively advise the suspect that he had a real choice
about giving an admissible statement at that juncture[.] Could they reasonably convey that he
could choose to stop talking even if he had talked earlier?”).
147. Id. at 613.
148. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966).
149. Cf. id. at 465 (“The entire thrust of police interrogation . . . in all the cases today[ ]
was to put the defendant in such an emotional state as to impair his capacity for rational
judgment.”); id. at 458 (“Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the com-
pulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can
truly be the product of his free choice.”).
150. Id. at 467–68, 476; see also Seibert, 542 U.S. at 611–12 (plurality opinion).
151. Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428, 431–32 (2000).
152. See, e.g., United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 636–37 (2004) (plurality opinion)
(“[T]he Miranda rule is a prophylactic employed to protect against violations of the Self-
Incrimination Clause. . . . [P]olice do not violate the Constitution . . . by mere failures to
warn.”).
153. See Yale Kamisar, Foreword: From Miranda to § 3501 to Dickerson to . . ., 99 Mich.
L. Rev. 879, 883–88 (2001) (“[A]t the time the Miranda opinion was handed down almost
everyone . . . understood that it was a constitutional decision—an interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. . . . In the 1970s, however, a new majority of
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Dickerson’s constitutionalization of Miranda implicitly eroded a key part
of the Elstad Court’s rationale and invited the Seibert Court to establish a
new standard for two-step interrogations.154 Elstad rested much of its analy-
sis on the argument that Miranda was merely prophylactic and not constitu-
tionally mandated.155 Consequently, Elstad held that the failure to issue
effective Miranda warnings did not automatically result in a confession’s
suppression.156 The Seibert plurality recognized this and “subtly overturned”
Elstad: now, only objectively “effective” warnings, consistent with Miranda,
can extinguish the taint of earlier failures to warn.157 Even if a post-warning
confession is voluntary, Justice Souter’s test does not admit the confession
unless the Miranda warnings were “effective.”158 The plurality’s approach
thus reaffirms the import of Miranda and the appropriate post–Dickerson
constitutional status of the Miranda warnings.159
The plurality opinion is also more consistent with Miranda in its focus
on the experience of the defendant and its emphasis on objective review.160
One of Miranda’s strengths was precisely its rejection of the pre-Miranda
subjective-voluntariness inquiry to determine whether confessions are co-
erced.161 Miranda established the objective, bright-line rule that if a defen-
dant is not warned, a confession must be suppressed.162 Still, Miranda, like
Justice Souter’s Seibert opinion, did not completely eliminate subjective in-
quiries: waivers had to be made “voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”163
the Supreme Court . . . began kicking dirt at Miranda. . . . [But Dickerson] dismissed the way
some majorities of the Court . . . had talked about Miranda in the past.”).
154. Leading Cases, supra note 110, at 310, 312 (“In holding, essentially, that unwarned
confessions are deemed coerced for constitutional purposes, Dickerson eviscerated the reason-
ing that undergirded Elstad.”).
155. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306–07 (1985).
156. Id. at 306–07, 309.
157. Leading Cases, supra note 110, at 313 (“Seibert subtly overturned Elstad’s presump-
tion that a voluntary prewarning confession produces a voluntary postwarning confession.”);
see also Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 611–12 (2004) (plurality opinion).
158. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 611–12 (plurality opinion).
159. But cf. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 636–37 (2004) (plurality opinion)
(contending that the Miranda rule is mere prophylaxis); Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s
Love–Hate Relationship with Miranda, 101 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 375, 376 (2011) (argu-
ing that in recent years, even post-Dickerson, “the Supreme Court’s . . . attitude towards its
landmark ruling in Miranda v. Arizona seems to be one of studied ambivalence” (footnote
omitted)).
160. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616–17 (plurality opinion). Justice Kennedy’s test, to the
contrary, offered an inquiry based on the difficult-to-prove subjective intent of law enforce-
ment. See id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
161. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
162. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468, 476 (1966).
163. Id. at 444; see also id. at 467 (noting that the defendant must be “adequately and
effectively appraised of his rights,” which may require a subjective inquiry if law enforcement
deviates from Miranda’s prescribed warnings).
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Instead of eliminating subjective inquiries, Miranda limited ad hoc, incon-
sistent reviews and ordered that law enforcement give warnings before inter-
rogations.164 The Seibert inquiry, true to Miranda, rectified the subjective
weakness of Elstad by “shift[ing] the focus to whether the Miranda warnings
were effective,” as opposed to whether the confession was subjectively
voluntary.165
While subjectivity is inherent in all the tests proposed (even Miranda
incorporates subjective components), Justice Souter’s plurality test most ef-
fectively limits the dangers inherent in subjective analysis. One criticism of
Justice Souter’s test is that it might be mere camouflage for the purely sub-
jective “voluntariness” inquiry.166 Even when the warnings are effective,
courts must determine whether a waiver of rights is “made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently.”167 Nonetheless, the disadvantage of the plural-
ity’s opinion—the fact that it still falls back on subjective, case-by-case vol-
untariness inquiries for waivers—is more pronounced in Justice Kennedy’s
test. Justice Kennedy’s test both begins with a subjective inquiry into the
officers’ intent and motive and often ends with Elstad’s similarly problematic
subjective-voluntariness inquiry.168
Although it is Seibert’s best offering, Justice Souter’s test is not perfect.
Unlike Miranda, the test is vague and leaves law enforcement without clear
guidance.169 Justice Souter also provides no guidance to courts about how to
weigh the differing effectiveness factors170 and thus promotes the risk that
courts will apply the test inconsistently. This vagueness represents a special
problem in the context of serious terrorism threats and national security
investigations where decisions need to be made quickly and have significant,
life-or-death implications. Still, despite its infirmities, Justice Souter’s test
focuses on the issues that are most relevant to the Fifth Amendment:
whether the defendant was sufficiently aware of his rights to be able to make
164. See id. at 444.
165. United States v. Carter, 489 F.3d 528, 534–35 (2d Cir. 2007); see also United States
v. Gonzalez-Lauzan, 437 F.3d 1128, 1137 (11th Cir. 2006) (“In answering that question, Elstad
relied on a presumption that a defendant’s waiver is voluntary in the absence of circumstances
showing otherwise. In contrast, the Seibert plurality looked more to whether the Miranda
warnings given to a reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes could function effectively as
Miranda requires, and required a multifactor test to determine their effectiveness.” (citation
omitted)).
166. See Rogers, supra note 33, at 313; see also Eric English, Note, You Have the Right to
Remain Silent. Now Please Repeat Your Confession: Missouri v. Seibert and the Court’s Attempt
to Put an End to the Question-First Technique, 33 Pepp. L. Rev. 423, 447–48 (2006).
167. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
168. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 620–22 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment).
169. English, supra note 166, at 447–48. Compare Seibert, 542 U.S. at 611 (plurality
opinion) (posing several questions to consider but declining to provide a clear definition of
what constitutes an “effective” warning), with Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (clearly establishing
when statements will be admissible in court and outlining procedural safeguards).
170. See infra Section III.B for a discussion of the application of Justice Souter’s factors.
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a “voluntar[y], knowing[,] and intelligent[ ]” choice to self-incriminate.171
For those reasons, and because the test is more consistent with prior Fifth
Amendment and Miranda jurisprudence, Justice Souter’s test remains Sei-
bert’s best offering.
B. Under Justice Souter’s Test, a Court Would Suppress Ahmed’s Confession
While Justice Kennedy’s test would focus on the subjective intentions of
the FBI agents who interrogated Ahmed, Justice Souter’s test would focus
instead on Ahmed’s experience and the objective effectiveness of Ahmed’s
Miranda warnings.172 Justice Souter offered five factors to analyze the inter-
rogation procedure and the effectiveness of midstream warnings. He used
the factors to contrast the good-faith, accidental failure to warn in Elstad—
where the warnings were objectively effective—with the intentional failure
to warn in Seibert—where the warnings were not objectively effective.173
While few courts have applied the plurality’s test in full, those that have
done so followed Justice Souter’s lead by using the plurality’s factors to dis-
tinguish the case under review from Elstad and Seibert to determine the
effectiveness of the Miranda warnings.174
A court using Justice Souter’s approach would likely have suppressed
Ahmed’s second-stage, self-incriminating statements. Applying Justice Sou-
ter’s factors to the Ahmed facts indicates that the case looks more like Seibert
than Elstad, suggesting that Ahmed’s midstream warnings were likely inef-
fective. Still, even though the government would likely be unable to intro-
duce Ahmed’s confessions, suppression would not overly hamper its interest
in acquiring valuable intelligence. Government officials could still interro-
gate Ahmed without offering Miranda warnings to acquire valuable national
security information. Prosecutors would then have to use evidence besides
Ahmed’s own incriminating statements to prosecute him.175 This result
would arguably make prosecutions more difficult, but the Self-Incrimination
Clause was never intended to facilitate easy convictions.176
Justice Souter’s first three factors focus on the questions interrogators
ask and the responses a defendant supplies. Courts must look to the “com-
pleteness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of inter-
rogation” and the “overlapping content of the two statements.”177 They must
171. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
172. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 611–12 (plurality opinion).
173. See id. at 615; Stewart J. Weiss, Missouri v. Seibert: Two-Stepping Towards the Apoc-
alypse, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 945, 968 (2005).
174. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 384 F.3d 520, 525 (8th Cir. 2004) (“The facts
before us are closer to those in Seibert than those in Elstad.”).
175. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 636–37 (2004) (plurality opinion).
176. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984) (“[W]hen the primary social
cost of those added protections is the possibility of fewer convictions, the Miranda majority
was willing to bear that cost.”); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 91 (1908), overruled in part
by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
177. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615 (plurality opinion).
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also examine “the degree to which the interrogator’s questions treated the
second round as continuous with the first.”178 These factors in Ahmed
strongly cut against admissibility. During the first interrogation, agents
questioned Ahmed in detail.179 They sought to ensure that he was comforta-
ble speaking freely and openly about what he knew about the terrorist group
al-Shabaab.180 The government wanted to gather the maximum amount of
information possible.181 Likewise, statements made during the first and sec-
ond interrogations concerned the same content. In both phases of the inter-
rogation, the defendant discussed his knowledge of al-Shabaab and his
participation in the group’s activities.182 While the two topics are distin-
guishable, even the government admitted that the first “dirty” interrogation
“inevitably elicited incriminating statements from the defendant.”183
The final two factors in Justice Souter’s test focus on the interrogation
atmosphere and again cut against admissibility when applied to Ahmed.
First, how did “the timing and setting of the first and the second” interroga-
tions compare?184 Second, was there “continuity of police personnel”?185 In
Ahmed, the first and second interrogations were separated by five days,186 but
this break seems insufficient compared to the full length of Ahmed’s deten-
tion.187 Also, although FBI agents “requested distinct personnel and a sepa-
rate room for the un-Mirandized and Mirandized interviews,”188 ultimately
agents interrogated Ahmed in nearly identical rooms, in a single building,
and with the same Nigerian security officials present.189 Consistent with Mi-
randa jurisprudence, the government’s desire to make the interrogation
phases more distinct lacks significance under Justice Souter’s test.190 Instead,
the fact that the two interrogations occurred in similar settings with overlap-
ping personnel supports suppression. If the room and at least some person-
nel were similar, “a reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes,”191 especially in
178. Id. Note that I analyze the factors here in a different order from that employed by
Justice Souter. The order should not significantly affect the ultimate outcome or analysis.
179. See Government Brief, supra note 5, at 30.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 29.
182. See id. at 31.
183. Id. at 32.
184. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 615 (2004) (plurality opinion).
185. Id.
186. Government Brief, supra note 5, at 43.
187. According to Ahmed, he was held “incommunicado” for forty-one days prior to
the unwarned interrogation, had no calendar or watch, and spent a total of over 100 days in
custody. Defense Brief, supra note 3, at 5, 63.
188. Government Brief, supra note 5, at 40 (emphasis added).
189. Defense Brief, supra note 3, at 61–62; Government Brief, supra note 5, at 39 (not-
ing that the interrogations occurred in the “same general location”).
190. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 613–14 (plurality opinion). But cf. id. at 622 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that efforts to “distinguish the two contexts” could
serve as sufficient curative measures).
191. Id. at 617 (plurality opinion).
December 2013] The Legality of Deliberate Miranda Violations 479
the context of a foreign terrorism interrogation, could conclude that there
was no effective difference between the first and second interrogations. Con-
sequently, under Justice Souter’s test, the midstream Miranda warnings were
likely ineffective, and Ahmed’s second-stage, unwarned confessions would
be suppressed.192
C. Marks Does Not Bar the Use of Justice Souter’s Test
While the majority of courts have concluded that Justice Kennedy’s test
is Seibert’s holding, courts can nonetheless use Justice Souter’s plurality
opinion consistent with the Supreme Court’s Marks v. United States rule.193
In Marks, the Supreme Court concluded that if the Court is divided, the
opinion that rules on the “narrowest grounds” may be viewed as the Court’s
holding.194 The Marks “narrowest grounds” test can be vague, and lower
courts must interpret which opinion in a divided Court is “narrowest.”
In the federal courts and among various commentators, there is growing
consensus that Justice Kennedy’s test is Seibert’s narrowest opinion and thus
its holding under Marks.195 Courts offer two basic rationales to support the
conclusion that Justice Kennedy’s opinion is narrowest. First, courts con-
sider the test to be narrower than that of the plurality because it would apply
to fewer factual circumstances.196 While the plurality’s opinion would apply
anytime law enforcement officials delayed administering Miranda warnings,
Justice Kennedy’s test would only apply in a narrow subset of cases where
officers used “the two-step interrogation technique . . . in a calculated way to
undermine the Miranda warning.”197 Second, courts consider Justice Ken-
nedy’s opinion to be narrowest because it merely carves out an exception to
192. In the context of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, these facts would cut in favor of ad-
mitting the second confession: although the interrogation conditions were similar, if the agents
had indeed requested different rooms or personnel, such a request suggests that they did not
intend to conduct a deliberate two-step interrogation designed to circumvent Miranda by con-
fusing the defendant. See id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
193. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
194. Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Courtney, 463 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e find
Seibert’s holding in Justice Kennedy’s opinion concurring in the judgment.”); United States v.
Briones, 390 F.3d 610, 613 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Because Justice Kennedy relied on grounds nar-
rower than those of the plurality, his opinion is of special significance.”); English, supra note
166, at 463. But see United States v. Carrizales-Toledo, 454 F.3d 1142, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006)
(“Determining the proper application of the Marks rule to Seibert is not easy, because arguably
Justice Kennedy’s proposed holding in his concurrence was rejected by a majority of the
Court.”).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Mashburn, 406 F.3d 303, 308 (4th Cir. 2005); see also
Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I would apply a narrower
test applicable only in the infrequent case, such as we have here . . . .”).
197. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 621–22 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see also
Mashburn, 406 F.3d at 308 (“Unlike the plurality opinion which announced a multi-factor test
that would apply to both intentional and unintentional two-stage interrogations, Justice Ken-
nedy’s concurring opinion set forth ‘a narrower test applicable only in . . . infrequent case[s]
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Elstad198: his test allows Elstad to survive in all circumstances except for the
“infrequent case[s]” his opinion targets.199 By contrast, the plurality arguably
effectively overrules Elstad.200
However, an opinion cannot be “narrowest” if it offers rationales com-
pletely independent from those of other, broader opinions. The Marks test is
simply not “workable” if a Supreme Court justice’s opinion does not “em-
body a position implicitly approved by at least five Justices who support the
judgment.”201 For Marks to apply, the “narrower” opinion must “represent a
common denominator of the Court’s reasoning.”202
This logic demonstrates that courts should question the narrowness of
Justice Kennedy’s opinion.203 The opinion is in some sense “narrower” in
that it applies in a smaller number of factual circumstances than the plural-
ity’s test, which might apply to all Miranda violations.204 Yet, what makes an
opinion “meaningfully” narrower is not the amount of times it will be ap-
plied but the breadth of its logic.205 We should ask, therefore, whether Justice
Kennedy’s opinion serves as a “logical subset of other, broader opinions”; if
not, Marks does not apply.206 If the Marks rule does not mandate that lower
courts use Justice Kennedy’s opinion, Seibert has no precedential holding
and lower courts can apply their own analyses to two-step interrogations.207
. . . .’ ” (citation omitted) (quoting Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment))).
198. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 489 F.3d 528, 535 (2d Cir. 2007).
199. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at
625–26 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Justice Kennedy’s test essentially “recog-
nize[es] an exception to Elstad for intentional violations”).
200. See id. at 622 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The plurality devours Oregon v. Elstad
. . . .”). But see United States v. Heron, 564 F.3d 879, 885 (7th Cir. 2009) (“In the case of
Seibert, the only thing we know for sure is that at least seven members of the Court . . .
accepted some kind of exception to Elstad . . . .”); Carter, 489 F.3d at 535–36 (2d Cir. 2007)
(“[A]ll of our sister circuits that have decided the issue have concluded that Seibert, rather than
overruling Elstad, carved out an exception to Elstad . . . . We now join our sister circuits . . . .”).
In stark contrast to Elstad, Justice Souter’s plurality opinion focuses not on whether the second
confession is voluntary but rather on whether the midstream Miranda warnings were objec-
tively effective. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 612 (plurality opinion).
201. King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc).
202. Id. (emphasis added).
203. See, e.g., Heron, 564 F.3d at 885.
204. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at
622 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The plurality devours Oregon v. Elstad . . . .”).
205. King, 950 F.2d at 781.
206. Id.
207. See Heron, 564 F.3d at 885 (“Counting Justice Breyer in the Kennedy camp, we are
left with only two Justices who support the intent-based test. This is obviously not the ‘com-
mon denominator’ that Marks was talking about.”); United States v. Carrizales-Toledo, 454
F.3d 1142, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Determining the proper application of the Marks rule to
Seibert is not easy, because arguably Justice Kennedy’s proposed holding in his concurrence
was rejected by a majority of the Court.”); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d
179, 189 (2d Cir. 2003) (“When it is not possible to discover a single standard that legitimately
constitutes the narrowest ground for a decision on that issue, there is then no law of the land
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In Seibert, Justice Kennedy’s opinion might not be the substantively or
logically “narrower” opinion, even if he intended courts to apply it less fre-
quently. The main logical thrust of his opinion is that confessions given
when officers intentionally withhold Miranda warnings for the purposes of
vitiating the effectiveness of those warnings must be analyzed differently
from other confessions.208 Eight justices categorically rejected this logic. Both
the dissent and the plurality eschewed analysis based on the subjective intent
of law enforcement and focused instead (to varying degrees) on the experi-
ence of the defendant.209 In the case of Ahmed, Justice Kennedy would ex-
amine the interrogating FBI agents’ subjective intent, whereas the other
eight justices on the Court would focus on Ahmed’s objective or subjective
experience.
While no federal circuit court has yet explicitly held that Justice Ken-
nedy’s test need not be applied under Marks, several have suggested this as a
possibility in dicta.210 For example, although the Seventh Circuit in United
States v. Heron declined to decide which Seibert test governs, it reasoned that
it was “risky to assume that the Court has announced any particular rule of
law” given the fragmented and logically distinct nature of the Seibert
opinions.211
The Supreme Court recently offered dicta that might give lower courts
further latitude to apply Justice Souter’s test. In Bobby v. Dixon, officers in-
tentionally failed to issue Miranda warnings for the admitted purpose of
rendering ineffective Archie Dixon’s right to remain silent.212 Dixon did not
confess during an unwarned interrogation, but later that day, after officers
gave him Miranda warnings in a separate interrogation, he confessed to
murder.213 The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit’s decision that the
confession should have been suppressed.214 Although the Sixth Circuit ruled
based on Justice Kennedy’s Seibert test, the Supreme Court concluded that
because no one standard commands the support of a majority of the Supreme Court.”); King,
950 F.2d at 782.
208. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
209. See id. at 613 (plurality opinion); id. at 628 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
210. See, e.g., Heron, 564 F.3d at 884–85 (“[W]e conclude that the Marks rule is not
applicable to Seibert. Although Justice Kennedy provided the crucial fifth vote for the majority,
we find it a strain at best to view his concurrence taken as a whole as the narrowest ground on
which a majority of the Court could agree.”); Carrizales-Toledo, 454 F.3d at 1151 (“Determin-
ing the proper application of the Marks rule to Seibert is not easy, because arguably Justice
Kennedy’s proposed holding in his concurrence was rejected by a majority of the Court.”);
State v. Farris, 849 N.E.2d 985, 994 (Ohio 2006) (applying the plurality test as the Seibert rule
and rejecting Kennedy’s subjective-intent test).
211. Heron, 564 F.3d at 885 (emphasis added).
212. 132 S. Ct. 26, 28 (2011) (per curiam). Note that this case did not include two-step
interrogations in the national security context. Bobby, 123 S. Ct. at 27–29.
213. Id. at 28.
214. Id. at 32.
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Seibert was inapplicable because Dixon did not confess during the earlier,
unwarned phase of the interrogation.215
In a short per curiam opinion, the Court largely ignored the deliberate-
ness of law enforcement’s question-first, warn-later tactic.216 Instead, the
Court focused on whether the “unwarned and warned interrogations
blended into one ‘continuum’ ” and whether the suspect’s previous “un-
warned interrogation . . . undermine[d] the effectiveness of the Miranda warn-
ings he received before confessing.”217 The Court concluded that because the
suspect had not confessed during the first unwarned interrogation, “the sort
of ‘two-step interrogation technique’ condemned in Seibert” did not impair
the “effectiveness” of the midstream warnings.218 The Supreme Court almost
completely eschewed the Sixth Circuit’s focus on the deliberateness of the
Miranda violation. Instead, the Court’s opinion focused on whether the
warnings were effective.219 While this case is distinguishable from Ahmed and
other Seibert-style interrogations because Dixon did not confess during the
unwarned interrogation, its analysis is revealing. The opinion suggests that
less than a decade after Seibert, the Court may be more open to adopting the
plurality’s approach.220
IV. Repairing Justice Kennedy’s Test: Reviving the
Self-Incrimination Clause
Justice Souter’s test best serves the spirit and letter of the Fifth Amend-
ment, but courts more widely apply Justice Kennedy’s test. As we have seen
through the lens of two-step national security interrogations, Justice Ken-
nedy’s focus on the subjective motives of law enforcement is a novel shift in
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence that weakens protections against involun-
tary self-incrimination. This Part therefore suggests mechanisms to remedy
Justice Kennedy’s test and mitigate some of its damage.
A. Evidentiary Standards That Honor the Fifth Amendment
Justice Kennedy gave no guidance on how to apply his test, and thus
courts are free to impose evidentiary rules that limit the disadvantages the
test bestows on defendants.221 Specifically, Justice Kennedy did not address
215. Id. at 31.
216. Id. at 31–32.
217. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 612 (2004) (plu-
rality opinion)).
218. Id. at 32.
219. Id.
220. See id. at 31 (noting that Justice Kennedy did himself say that his opinion was
narrower but conspicuously declining to endorse the opinion as Seibert’s narrowest opinion
and rule).
221. See United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 477 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Justice Kennedy
had no reason to explore how a court should determine when a two-step interrogation strat-
egy had been executed deliberately.”); accord United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1158
(9th Cir. 2006).
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how courts should weigh the testimony of law enforcement if agents deny
that they sought to undermine the effectiveness of Miranda warnings. We
likewise do not know which party has the burden of proving or disproving
intent and motive. Both of these open questions provide opportunities to
rectify some of the dangers of the test. Evidentiary burdens can limit the
advantages Justice Kennedy’s test gives to the government and thus constrain
the government’s prosecutorial power. In the case of national security inter-
rogations, evidentiary burdens will help the courts to more effectively scruti-
nize an agent’s claim that his failure to warn was motivated solely by a desire
to capture vital national intelligence. Moreover, since these are open ques-
tions, courts can answer them in a manner that aligns with the spirit of the
Self-Incrimination Clause while still staying consistent with the letter of Jus-
tice Kennedy’s allegedly governing opinion.
1. Scrutiny of Official Testimony
Courts should heavily scrutinize, and thus more easily discredit, the tes-
timony of a federal agent that proffers a novel or “illegitimate” motive for
undertaking two-step interrogations.222 Heavily scrutinizing official testi-
mony would predetermine what motives are more believable. Still, such
scrutiny would not end the inquiry because even officials proffering a less
believable or legitimate motive could offer objective evidence to support that
motive. Nonetheless, with this rule, courts can more effectively and con-
cretely analyze testimony relating to an official’s subjective intent. Courts
can also use this rule to offer clearer guidance about what types of two-step
interrogations are more or less acceptable.
A “legitimate” motive could be a motive that the Supreme Court ac-
cepted prior to Seibert. For instance, courts could more easily believe a law
enforcement official who claims that his motive in undertaking a two-step
interrogation was not to vitiate the effectiveness of the Miranda warnings
but rather to respond to an imminent threat to public safety. This motive
would be consistent with the public safety exception outlined in New York v.
Quarles and would thus stand as more “legitimate” and credible. Conse-
quently, a government official proffering this rationale for his conduct could
more easily demonstrate that his motive in undertaking a two-step interro-
gation was not to render the Miranda warnings ineffective.223 In the context
of national security interrogations, the motive of eliciting information for
222. While the Second Circuit has not clearly defined “legitimate” versus “illegitimate,”
it has adopted a rule that more closely scrutinizes official testimony when officials present
“illegitimate” reasons for delaying Miranda warnings. United States v. Moore, 670 F.3d 222,
229 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Williams, 435 F.3d at 1159 (“Once a law enforcement officer has
detained a suspect and subjects him to interrogation—as was the case in Seibert and is the case
here—there is rarely, if ever, a legitimate reason to delay giving a Miranda warning until after
the suspect has confessed.”).
223. See Williams, 435 F.3d at 1158–59.
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national security purposes is novel and would be less credible if the interro-
gation did not respond to an imminent threat. Consequently, in this con-
text, federal agents would have to buttress their testimony with substantial
objective and contextual evidence.
Applying heavy scrutiny to new reasons to justify failures to issue Mi-
randa warnings merely weighs the evidence that law enforcement presents to
the court. It does not change Justice Kennedy’s test because new reasons to
warn can still pass muster. This rule would merely make it harder for the
government to pass Justice Kennedy’s test and thus mitigate the inherent
advantages that Justice Kennedy’s test awards to the government. Defendants
such as Ahmed would thus recapture some of the protections that Justice
Kennedy’s test diminished.
2. Burden of Proof
After a criminal defendant alleges that the government violated his Fifth
Amendment rights, a court should allocate the burden of proof to the gov-
ernment to disprove that its agents intentionally engaged in a two-step inter-
rogation for the purpose of rendering the Miranda warnings ineffective.224
While courts sometimes reject forcing a party to disprove a negative,225 the
particular disadvantages and the import of this inquiry demand that the
government bear this burden. Often, the question of intent and motive will
decide whether a defendant’s confession should be suppressed.226 The stakes
of this oft-decisive question thus demand some efforts to equalize the
field.227
Unless the government is forced to bear the burden of proof, a court
will often lack the opportunity to examine probative evidence. The evidence
that demonstrates law enforcement’s subjective intent and motive is typically
“in the hands of the government.”228 The law must incentivize the govern-
ment to disseminate that evidence both to the court and to the defendant.
All that a defendant alone can speak to are the facts related to his particular
experience, and those facts will not often present viable arguments about an
agent’s subjective intent.229
Because the Second Circuit allocates the burden of proof in this way, we
can see this rule’s advantages in Ahmed. There, the government was forced to
224. Several circuits, including the Second and the Eighth, have allocated the burden of
proof here to the government for many of the reasons enumerated in this Section. See, e.g.,
Capers, 627 F.3d at 479; United States v. Ollie, 442 F.3d 1135, 1142–43 (8th Cir. 2006).
225. Ollie, 442 F.3d at 1143.
226. Capers, 627 F.3d at 479.
227. See id.
228. Id.
229. In Ahmed, for example, the defendant would not have known about the probative,
“significant efforts” law enforcement had taken to ensure that his two interrogations were
distinct experiences. See Government Brief, supra note 5, at 34. Although those efforts may
have failed to produce different interrogation experiences from Ahmed’s perspective, they do
provide illuminating evidence of the agents’ subjective intent.
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reveal evidence about its agents’ intent, evidence that Ahmed could never
have had access to otherwise.230 Especially in the national security context,
where interrogations may be classified and highly secretive, it is important to
impose a burden on the government to expose evidence of what actually
occurred during an interrogation.
Unlike a defendant who challenges the admissibility of his confession
under Miranda, a defendant who challenges a confession based on Justice
Kennedy’s Seibert test often lacks relevant information. Under Miranda, to
demonstrate that a confession was presumptively coerced, all a defendant
needed to do was prove that law enforcement failed to advise him of his
rights.231 Miranda thus asked a simple question: Was a defendant warned?
The defendant in Miranda possessed all the evidence to answer this ques-
tion. He knew whether he was warned and could offer his own evidence on
the subject. By contrast, under Justice Kennedy’s test, nearly all the relevant
information lies with the government. The defendant may simply have no
knowledge of important facts that would allow him to demonstrate law en-
forcement’s bad intent. Forcing the government to prove that officials did
not seek to vitiate the effectiveness of the Miranda warnings can rectify this
information imbalance.
3. A Mixed-Motive Presumption
Allocating the burden of proof to the government may not be sufficient.
This Note suggests that it may be easier for the government to demonstrate
that agents have not intentionally engaged in a two-step interrogation for
the purpose of undermining the Miranda warnings’ effectiveness when the
government demonstrates a credible alternative motive.232 The analysis of
Ahmed in Part II shows that the credible alternative motive—seeking infor-
mation relevant to national security—combined with probative objective ev-
idence might allow the government to easily pass Justice Kennedy’s test. This
possibility puts a defendant at a disadvantage and allows law enforcement, in
effect, to disregard the Miranda warnings and the warnings’ ability to pro-
tect a defendant’s right against self-incrimination.
Applying a presumption that law enforcement undertakes intentional,
two-step interrogations with mixed motives counters this disadvantage. For
this Note’s purposes, a “mixed-motive,” two-step interrogation occurs when
the government undertakes an intentional, two-step interrogation both for
the purpose of rendering the Miranda warnings ineffective and for some
other valid motive. In Ahmed, for instance, the defense argued that the gov-
ernment’s actions and testimony demonstrated that the interrogation was
conducted for dual purposes: first, eliciting information deemed vital for
national security, and second, undermining the effectiveness of the Miranda
230. See Government Brief, supra note 5, at 27–29 (discussing the content of agents’
testimony).
231. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
232. See supra Section II.B.
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warnings.233 If courts were to apply a mixed-motive presumption, they
would presuppose that evidence of a permitted motive (e.g., national secur-
ity–based motives) does not prove lack of a prohibited motive. The govern-
ment would have to present more than a credible, alternative motive to
successfully oppose a defendant’s motion to suppress.
This is perhaps a difficult presumption to overcome, but it would not
overly hamper interrogation effectiveness. If law enforcement officials deter-
mine that a two-step process is needed, they can undertake the process and
apply robust curative measures.234 Such curative measures might include, as
Justice Kennedy suggested, a detailed, midstream addendum warning ex-
plaining the differences between the two phases of the interrogation and the
effects those distinctions have on the defendant’s rights. An addendum
warning could be crafted in lay terms to mitigate confusion.235 The govern-
ment could also ensure that significant time passes between the “dirty” and
“clean” phases of a two-step interrogation commensurate with the overall
context of a defendant’s ongoing detention.236 Such robust curative measures
would not only allow the government to pass Justice Kennedy’s secondary
curative measures inquiry but also might provide significant objective evi-
dence to disprove the mixed-motive presumption.
This mixed-motive presumption would not eliminate two-step interro-
gations, but it would limit the disadvantages Justice Kennedy’s test imposes
on defendants. Effectively, with this presumption, the subjective inquiry
would no longer be completely dispositive because of the difficulty of over-
coming the government’s burden of proof. Instead, the effectiveness of the
curative measures would become more important. If a court applied Justice
Kennedy’s subjective inquiry using a mixed-motive presumption, the test
would become very similar to that of the plurality. The ultimate admissibil-
ity of a defendant’s confession would be based on whether curative measures
objectively ensured the effectiveness of the Miranda warnings.237 Like that of
Justice Souter, such an inquiry is more consistent with Miranda and the
Fifth Amendment.
B. Law Enforcement Need Not Fear the Miranda Warnings
Officials should not shy away from issuing Miranda warnings because
the outcomes of interrogations may not change when officials warn a defen-
dant of his rights. At least one empirical study suggests that many or most
233. Defense Brief, supra note 3, at 52–54.
234. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 621–22 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment).
235. Cf. Thompson, supra note 86, at 680 (suggesting that “highly technical and legalis-
tic” addendum warnings would be ineffective).
236. The longer a defendant has been detained or interrogated, as in Ahmed’s case, the
longer the amount of time that separates distinct phases of the interrogation should be.
237. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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defendants waive their rights.238 Based on that data, Miranda warnings do
not seem to strongly affect the ultimate outcome of an interrogation. Still,
the fact that defendants often waive their rights does not minimize the im-
port of Miranda warnings. The Fifth Amendment does not mandate that
defendants must remain silent during interrogations but rather that their
choice to speak should be their own.239 Miranda warnings allow defendants
to make that choice, although it often seems that defendants choose to
speak.240
Particularly in the national security context, the warnings may not ulti-
mately affect how much information a defendant will provide. One com-
mentator argues that terrorism suspects, unencumbered by the silencing
“omerta”241 culture of domestic criminal organizations, are highly likely to
speak to American officials.242 A terrorist group’s goal typically includes
“broadcasting its message.”243 Given the “nihilistic and unhinged” nature of
modern terrorist organizations, it seems likely that a captured terrorist
would want to express the “justness and legitimacy” of his “cause” directly
to his “enemy.”244 Miranda warnings thus might not thwart the collection of
vital intelligence.
Moreover, just prosecutions should not rest entirely on self-incriminat-
ing statements, especially those offered during confusing and possibly coer-
cive two-step interrogations. If a prosecutor needs confessions to prosecute a
suspect of some sort of serious terrorism-based crime, perhaps there is in-
sufficient evidence for a court to convict. Even voluntary confessions can be
unreliable,245 and officials seeking to do justice should be wary of resting
cases solely on interrogations procured via suspect, two-step procedures.
238. Leo, supra note 32, at 654 (noting that in his empirical study about the effects of
the Miranda warnings, 78.29 percent of people waived their Miranda rights after receiving
warnings).
239. U.S. Const. amend. V.
240. Leo, supra note 32, at 654.
241. See generally United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1149 n.96 (3d Cir. 1990)
(defining “omerta” as a “[criminal] enterprise’s code of silence”); see also United States v.
Carrozza, 4 F.3d 70, 89 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that the defendant took “the oath of ‘omerta’ to
protect the secrets of the Patriarca Family of La Cosa Nostra to his grave”).
242. Wadie E. Said, The Message and Means of the Modern Terrorism Prosecution, 21
Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 175, 179–80 (2012).
243. Id. at 180.
244. Id. at 180–81. Three examples prove illustrative: the 1998 U.S. Embassy bomber,
the Detroit Christmas Day “underwear bomber,” and the Times Square bomber each waived
their rights. Id. The embassy bomber in particular expressed “a strong desire to speak with
representatives of his enemy.” Id. at 181.
245. See Major Peter Kageleiry, Jr., Psychological Police Interrogation Methods: Pseudosci-
ence in the Interrogation Room Obscures Justice in the Courtroom, 193 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 43 (2007)
(arguing that even legally voluntary confessions can be “psychologically involuntary”).
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Conclusion
Two-step national security interrogations demonstrate the dangers in-
herent in the Supreme Court’s recent Miranda jurisprudence. While the
confessions Ahmed made during his two-step national security interrogation
would likely be admissible under Justice Kennedy’s test, they would be inad-
missible under Justice Souter’s plurality test. Justice Kennedy’s test affords
substantial advantages to the government at the expense of a defendant’s
right against self-incrimination. Consequently, under Justice Kennedy’s test,
law enforcement can more easily use the coercive pressures of interrogation
environments to elicit incriminating statements.
The right against self-incrimination is “of great value, a protection to
the innocent though a shelter to the guilty, and a safeguard against heedless,
unfounded or tyrannical prosecutions.”246 Like the Constitution itself, it
cannot be jettisoned when convenience demands. Law enforcement has ef-
fective interrogation options that also limit the danger that confessions will
be coerced. Those options should reign supreme. Unless law enforcement
provides greater protections for defendants, courts should not allow prose-
cutors to admit confessions derived from two-step national security interro-
gations. Individual rights should not be so liberally sacrificed on the altar of
the collective good.
246. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 91 (1908), overruled in part by Malloy v. Ho-
gan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
